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It has been widely recognized, at least since the Selma
march during the civil rights movement, that the inter-
ests of black citizens and other minorities are directly
connected to their capacity to participate in the political
process and to public policies that protect that option.
The clear message of the Selma demonstration was that,
for a people constrained by a broad range of oppressive
racist structures, voting is a basic resource for protecting
all other rights. Further, -it was clear that those who
control power will restrict access to the ballot as their
main line of defense. 1
Today, no doubt, we are less sanguine about the
significance of electoral campaigns given the persis-
tence of so many problems. Black communities con-
tinue to face severely restricted economic opportunities
and there has been resegregation, in effect, of public
school education. Public channels can be woefully inef-
fective as seen in the Rodney King verdict and the
reaction in Los Angeles. Still, the messages of Selma
ring true when we think about what will be necessary to
bring real change under the conditions of the 1990s.
It is especially important to think about current trends
as we approach the 1992 elections and anticipate the
form that political struggle will take in the coming
decade. Redistributing power will remain important,
and difficult, no matter the outcome of this election.
Indeed, if things go as expected, the elections in Novem-
ber will be characterized by a low turnout among those
very populations that suffer most from the economic
conditions prevailing in the 1990s and in whose name
the most persistent demands forjustice have been raised.
The threat to minorities in general, and to the black
community in particular, is twofold. First, winning poli-
ticians may continue to refuse to use the powers of
government for positive action. Second, political cam-
paigning will be driven by such incidents as the Willie
Horton caper that ignore real issues and demean a whole
racial group. Recent history gives ample evidence of this
possibility in the policies and campaign tactics of Ro-
nald Reagan and George Bush in the period 1980-1 992. 2
Changing Political Policy
There is a growing genre of writings, both popular
and academic, that give ample attention to the social and
economic philosophy and policies of the Reagan and
Bush administrations. The general interpretation is that
these policies represent a major impact, making the
1980s a distinctive—and regressive—era in U.S. politi-
cal history. Little has been said, however, about policies
on politics. 3 When the issue was raised, it was framed as
a discussion of the threat of a "permanent Congress,"
term limitations, and campaign financing—items which
betray a profound distrust of the voter, if not of democ-
racy itself. There was little discussion about registration
and voting. But, these two administrations have presided
over a growing restriction of the American electorate. In
the early 1990s, at the end of three terms of Republican
presidential power, it is clear that the practice of political
participation itself is a critical social justice problem in
the United States.
The basic facts are undisputed. To exercise minimal
influence on policy, Americans are called upon to cast
ballots in a myriad of elections, at several levels of
government at different times. There has been low
voting at all levels. The last presidential election contin-
ued the decline, going back to the Kennedy-Nixon race
of 1960, in the percentage of Americans voting. State
and local contests have substantially lower turnout than
even the presidential elections. The 1992 presidential
primaries recorded lower levels of voter turnout com-
pared to 1988. 4
Low voting is marked, to be sure, by some condescen-
sion. The well-to-do may deem themselves above the
political fray. But, low voting is characterized more so
by ineffective participation among people who find it
difficult to negotiate the maze of residency require-
ments, dual registration, cut-off dates, purges, English-
language-only instructions, ballot security checks, awk-
ward registration sites, or inconvenient office hours.
Consequently they do not get registered to vote and
cannot make their voices heard. Electoral participation
is critical in setting the public agenda but remains low
and skewed away from racial minorities and the poor.
The Legacy of the 1980s
In significant part, these conditions are a legacy of the
ineffective voting reforms of the 1980s. Indeed, the
Reagan and Bush administrations have been uniformly
hostile to reforms designed to increase voter participa-
tion while supporting other voting changes (such as term
limits) that decrease the choice of voters. In his first year
in office, Reagan lobbied against an amendment to the
federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 that would have
expanded the coverage of the act. 5 Reagan changed
course on this in the face of overwhelming congres-
sional and popular opinion and agreed to a compromise
that preserved the essential changes necessary to im-
prove the law. 6
The Reagan-Bush administrations also gradually
changed their opposition to other voting reforms. They
came to support affirmative districting, for example.
The single-member district was supported as an alterna-
tive to at-large election, and different patterns ofdistricts
were supported so that constituencies of majority-mi-
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nority voters could be created usually ensuring the
election of a minority. That change, while dramatic, had
been slow in coming. The Reagan administration argued
against these reforms in a number of lawsuits during the
1980s. By the 1990 round of reapportionment, the ad-
ministration was accused of being prominority on redis-
tricting!
7 This turnabout is intriguing and provides fur-
ther insight into the complex relationship, and trade-off,
between efforts to expand the franchise and efforts, on
the other hand, to adjust to the restricted electorate.
Affirmative districting, for example, is used to compen-
sate for underparticipation in minority populations. The
administration, then, is in the position of rejecting voting
improvement measures while supporting the compensa-
tory device. 8
The Reagan administration was effective in restrict-
ing the involvement of legal services lawyers in voting
discrimination lawsuits. This decision was significant
The Reagan and Bush administrations have
been uniformly hostile to reforms designed to
increase voter participation. .
.
because of the cost of bringing voting litigation. The
Legal Services Corporation is an independent, publicly
funded agency that provides professional assistance to
low income persons and communities not otherwise able
to pay legal costs. The Reagan administration ordered
the Legal Services Corporation to discontinue chal-
lenges to discrimination in voting on the grounds that
this work is "political." The change placed more of a
burden on the Department of Justice—a politically sen-
sitive agency—and the private groups in the civil rights
community. The Bush administration continued the
attack on the Legal Services Corporation including a ban
on legal support to communities challenging election
structures.
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The Reagan administration was also active in block-
ing reform initiatives taken by the states and communi-
ties. In an extraordinary 1985 action, the full weight of
federal power was brought to bear on the wide-spread
investigation and prosecution ofcommunity-based voter
registration and Get-Out-The-Vote activists in Alabama's
Black Belt. Eight visible black community leaders were
prosecuted, including Albert Turner who had been an
organizer of the Selma marches. After a year of investi-
gation, the government was able to convict only one of
the persons on a minor charge of mishandling absentee
ballots. Although a federal lawsuit charging selective
prosecution was inconclusive, the effort amounted to
harassment of leaders and effectively chilled political
work for some time.
The National Litigation Campaign
Reagan's action is also well-illustrated by looking at
the response to a special voter registration campaign in
the mid-1980s. That campaign was developed by Hu-
man SER\ I L(Sen iceEmployees Registrationand Voter
Education) and involved a loose coalition of advocacy
groups newl) drawn to voting work including ACORN
(Association ot Community Organizations for Reform
Now). Project Vote, and ( 'oniinon Cause. Croups in
the campaign argued that the responsibility lor voter
registration was that ol the government rather than
individual citizens. The campaign sought to define the
issue of participation in terms ol three factors: first, that
registration itself was the problem: second, that reform
initiatives should be taken at the local level; and third,
that practical remedies do exist within the authorit) ol
local officials. The key fact for the campaign was their
finding that a relatively high level of voting occurs
among citizens once they register. While voter turnout
routinely measures below 50 percent when those voting
are counted against all age-eligibles, the levels are much
higher when voters are compared only to those regis-
tered. Not convinced that this was a sign of apathy, the
sponsors of the registration campaign determined regis-
tration itself to be a barrier."
The goal of the special campaign was to improve
levels of voting by removing barriers to registration
through action at the local level. This strategy seemed
appealing. The barriers were embedded in the adminis-
trative process, were racially neutral on their face, and
had not been brought within the scope of the federal
Voting Rights Act. Further, the primary responsibility
for setting registration requirements is at the state and
local levels and all of these barriers were put in place
there. Finally, this strategy allowed the reformers to give
attention to innovative procedures in neighboring states
that could be used as models. This last factor was helpful
in two ways: It allowed them to rebut the charges that
more open registration necessarily resulted in fraud; and
it allowed them to show improvement in turnout levels.
Finally, there were ideological and practical advantages
to the local focus given the New Federalism of the
Reagan-era which aimed to increase the role of local
officials in all policy areas.
A range of specific reforms were advocated and
several emerged as typical of the campaign. One would
require voting officials to allow registration by mail.
Another would expand the duties of certain agencies to
include voter registration. This would apply to govern-
ment social services agencies that serve large numbers
of citizens in the normal course of business and include
driver's license bureaus serving a general clientele as
well as food surplus lines where the hard-core poor
could be reached.
Another strategy was to file lawsuits where specific
barriers could be challenged. However, unlike the ex-
panding litigation under the Voting Rights Act, which
focused on office holding, this litigation targeted regis-
tration. The challenges were often brought in state court
pursuant to the state constitutions. Between 1984 and
1987 there were twenty-nine registration access law-
suits active in twelve states and in the federal courts. 12
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A key assumption in the strategic thinking of the
campaign concerned the growing number of persons
holding official positions who had an interest in easing
access because they had been elected from biracial
constituencies. It was expected that these officials would
be sympathetic to reforms making their own base more
firm. There were some dramatic gestures. In 1987, a task
force of the National Association of Secretaries of State
issued a report incorporating a good deal of the thinking
of the campaign, stating that ". . .full participation awaits
major reform and full implementation of the registration
outreach methods that are already known and in use in
states throughout the nation." 13
Also, several officials moved decisively. Governors
in Montana, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, and Texas
—all states with significant minority populations
—
issued executive orders to institute some form of agency-
based, nonpartisan registration.
Republican party officials opposed the efforts vigor-
ously.
14 The Federal Office of Personnel Management
wrote the governors with an opinion that the state actions
violated federal law. After the 1984 election, the Reagan
administration initiated investigations of the state or-
ders. The action was especially noteworthy because
such intervention went against the New Federalism
ideology. 15
Attempts at Voting Reform in the States
In the state of Mississippi, the state chapter of Opera-
tion PUSH (People United to Save Humanity) and other
black citizens went into federal court and challenged the
whole range of state registration laws. A federal lawsuit
was filed in March 1984. After trials and appeals, the
final decision was rendered seven years later in 1991!
The Mississippi litigation represented an effort to use
demonstrable evidence of discrimination to convince
the federal court to require extensive registration re-
form. The court, however, deferred to the state legisla-
ture which corrected several flagrant practices and en-
acted a mail-registration law, but refused to pass any of
the more radical measures. 16
In California the results were also mixed. The state
supreme court refused to hear the case which removed
any possibility of a statewide ruling. However, a coali-
tion of groups, including Common Cause, the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, and the Mexican-
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, filed a
suit in superior court challenging restrictive practices in
Los Angeles county. County officials contested the
lawsuit but the court ordered them to adopt an agency-
based system.
Operating in the several states was expensive and
time-consuming. Results were uneven. In some states
with more flexible officials, negotiations were fruitful.
In other states, local officials contested the proposed
changes as vigorously in state court as in federal court.
In others, federal court intervention was necessary, after
all. The campaign was probably most effective in pub-
licizing the alternative ways of looking at how to do
registration and drawing attention to reforms actually in
place in other states. 17
The Federal Response
Another effort to address the problem of registration
occurred at the federal level. During his first months in
office, Jimmy Carter proposed to Congress a major
reform in voter registration laws. 18 Carter's proposal
included same-day registration, financial assistance to
the states, registration by mail, off-site registrars, crimi-
nal penalties for fraud, and such other items as campaign
financing for the House and Senate, direct popular
election of the president, and modification of the Hatch
Act. These proposals were introduced in Congress as the
Universal Voter Registration Act of 1977. The legisla-
tion was not acted upon during the Carter years, 1977-
1980.
But, with the victories by Reagan in 1980 and 1984,
there was new official concern about voting. 19 During
Reagan's second term, a comprehensive bill was pro-
posed in Congress. The Universal Voter Registration
Act of 1987 proposed to set up a uniform national
registration law under federal control. The bill, spon-
sored by Alan Cranston, incorporated the main premises
of the registration reform campaign but was directed at
a federal-level response. It accepted the notion that voter
registration is a government responsibility that should
involve innovative outreach efforts and incentives. The
bill included provisions for mail-in registration, elec-
tion-day registration, and agency-based registration. It
would have also provided a system of federal funding to
encourage states to develop plans for compliance. This
bill never received support from the president and did
not pass Congress.
The behavior of the Reagan administration had a
dramatic and confounding impact on how to think about
voting. In Reagan, the country had its most politically
conservative and actively partisan president in modern
times. His outlook was narrow and, so it was expected,
sure to provoke alternative mobilization among con-
stituencies hurt by his policies but eligible to vote.
Instead, in Reagan's 1984 bid for reelection and in
Bush's election in 1988, the electorate returned the
Republican party to presidential power on a smaller
percentage of the voters than at the time of Reagan's first
election!
Another proposal was introduced in Congress during
the first year of the Bush presidency. It was less compre-
hensive than the Cranston bill but incorporated many of
the ideas about registration that had become current.
This bill did not receive presidential support but was
more successful in that it passed the House but lost to a
filibuster in the Senate in September of 1990 and again
in 1991.
A third—less ambitious—voter registration bill was
introduced. This was known as the motor voter bill,
passed by Congress in 1992, that would allow voter
26
registration at driver's license bureaus. The legislation
passed Congress but was vetoed by President Bush on
July 2, four months before an election in which he v\ as
a candidate. This effectively ended the major federal
legislative action although state-'^vel proposals remain
active.
20
In the veto of the motor voter bill, Bush continued the
legacy of hostility of the 1 980s. However, on two other
issues bearing on political access for racial minorities,
the administration's position was less hostile. One con-
cerns Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act requiring
assistance to language minorities that expires in 1992.
The other issue concerns Supreme Court decisions.
Two rulings in 1992 suggest that the federal judiciary,
which had been a strong protector of voting rights, may
be changing its stance. In one decision, the Court al-
lowed a state law in Hawaii that prohibits write-in
candidates to stand. 21 In another, the Court made a
narrow interpretation of the Voting Rights Act to allow
a local jurisdiction to change and reduce the powers of
an office in reaction to the first election of a black person.
This second decision, Presley v. Etowah County,22
came out of traditional bi-racial southern communities
that exhibit a very typical bigotry. Successful lawsuits
challenging at-large elections had forced previously all-
white governing commissions to adopt single-member
districts that guaranteed black majority districts. In
response, the Alabama state legislature, raising images
of the infamous gerrymander at Tuskegee, was pre-
vailed upon to change and reduce the powers of the
office. The state refused to submit the change for
preclearance as required by Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. The Court, stressing a narrow interpretation
of the act, decided that the change was not really a
change in voting and did not need to be submitted.
The decision in Presley was ominous for two reasons
:
first, the state's action was a direct response to effective
use of the ballot by a minority; second, the change falls
in a class of maneuvers made in response to empower-
ment efforts and is sure to invite similar changes in other
jurisdictions. And, because government reorganization
can be a rational decision unrelated to discrimination,
scrutiny under Section 5 would be a way to develop
standards and instill confidence. The Bush administra-
tion did support minority voters in this dispute by
arguing to apply the act to the Presley circumstances.
However, its efforts were blocked by the Court's major-
ity, composed of Reagan-Bush appointees, who agreed
with the narrow construction and exempted the change
from coverage under the act.
Rethinking Voting Policy - Toward
True Reform in the 1990s
The experience with voting reform in the 1980s is a
starting point to rethink voting policy on the whole. Four
factors make our task difficult. I have already mentioned
the successful way in which the Reagan and Bush
administrations have politicized voting access. A sec-
ond factor is the dramatic rise <>| minority elected offi-
cials—a condition that obscures the continuing problem
of popular participation.
Two other trends bear some mention in conclusion.
Low voting levels may be explained away by certain
otherwise well-meaning conceptions of the community
of potential voters. This is especially troubling with
respect to popular images associated with the
neoconscn alive notions about the urban widen lass
Theories about the essential character, or civic virtue, of
the poor have always been a topic of concern in societies
divided by wealth. Allegations about a distinctive psy-
chology associated with racist oppression in the United
States reemerges during each historical period. The
political implication of this notion, in current discus-
sions on poverty, is to undermine the very expectation
that this population would act effectively in politics. It
grounds the cause of ineffective political action in inter-
nal attributes. It will be difficult to see the significance
of low voting where flawed agency is assumed on the
part of a large sector of the population.
But, complacency is not the only assumption result-
ing from notions about the underclass. The notion ap-
peals to the most backward instincts of the nation's
liberal reform tradition—i.e., its paternal urge to act/b/-
victims rather than to act with them. When such attitudes
gain currency among potential allies in the liberal wings
of the parties, the major funding institutions, or in black
leadership circles, it can produce bizarre results. One
response has been to embrace a charismatic motivation
that could "speak to" those in horrid social conditions
and motivate them to join the electorate. This was the
rationale behind the national mobilizations by Jesse
Jackson during the 1980s. This notion represented a
specific strategic alternative. But, the consequence has
been continued low levels of voter participation and
renewed doubts about the political impact of charism.
The political parties have adjusted to the restricted
electorate and now compete on its terms. The Republi-
cans, even when claiming their appeal to be anti-elitist
and populist, learned this early and enjoyed successes
especially in the presidential elections ofNixon, Reagan,
and Bush. 23 The Democrats have moved increasingly in
recent years to replicate that effort. One example is
recent elections in Virginia where that party was able to
recapture the governor's office and a U.S. Senate seat
after a string of defeats in state elections. The election of
the state's first black governor showed that the strategy
had some implications for racial justice. Another ex-
ample is 1986 midterm elections when Democrats won
a string of seats to recapture a majority in the U.S. Senate
by running a series of middle-of-the-road white men.
The effort to transfer these tactics to the presidential
level is represented in the rise of the Democratic Lead-
ership Council (DLC)—the group that has propelled the
1992 Clinton candidacy—where the platform and ideol-
ogy are structured to compete within the known elector-
ate.
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But, such a strategy, while commendable in its real-
ism and probably successful in retaining a competitive,
two-party system, will hardly do much to change the
basic discussion of public issues if the voting constitu-
ency remains exclusive. Racial minorities will continue
to face an inattentive government or insulting campaign
discourse as they are made into the issue that will tip the
balance of an election.
There is little reason to expect any real improvement
in voter participation given current policies and politics.
But, it is important to think about the future. A starting
point would be a uniform national system. Advocacy
work would need to continue in communities to forge
whatever changes are possible. But, the need to change
official policy—national or local—should be comple-
mented by an organizing strategy tied to political work
among the nonvoters. The efforts to respond to low
voting in the 1980s moved away from grassroots orga-
nizing to a focus on institutional barriers. This repre-
sented a significant turn that resulted in an increasing
focus on legislative lobbying and bureaucratic reform.
It is a commentary on the changing times that the
Voter Education Project (VEP)—organized in the seed-
bed of militant voter registration and education—closed
down in January of 1992. That event marked the end of
an institution intimately associated with mobilizing new
voters in the black community. Its closing helps to focus
attention on how and whether to revive an approach that
may be fading as a tactic for empowerment. Insofar as
VEP represents a model, it is one in which organizing is
done for political results and the entreaty to register is
openly connected to the goal ofempowering new people
to address their problems. The sense of the politics of
that organizing was gradually lost and replaced by a
nonpolitical stance justified by concerns over partisan-
ship. During the 1980s, when concern mounted about
low voting, and while all voting policies were increas-
ingly politicized, the two were confused and the rational
need to be nonpartisan, that was required in order to
avoid capture by the two parties, was confused with the
need to avoid a political stance altogether. So, the
rationale for voter registration work loss the connection
to power. It was sometimes stated as merely benign
(where it means nothing) or dismissed as deceptive (a
surreptitious partisan attack). Proponents of voter regis-
tration found themselves in the position of promising to
keep their hands off politics! Today it is necessary to
recapture the new voter mobilization represented by
VEP and to reintegrate the political stance and grassroots
methodology.
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